Partisans, Parasites, and Traitor-Patriots
Introduction - On Japanese Strategy
Observing the events of 1942, especially in the West Pacific and Southeast Asia, one is presented with an anomaly; the Japanese went to war with their nominal allies Britain and France weeks prior to beginning their war with the United Republics. The reason for this is quite simple: Clement Attlee.
The diplomatic and strategic shift in France and Great Britain’s diplomatic orientation away from Nazi Germany and Concordist Japan over the last months of 1941 and beginning of 1942 would culminate with the vote of no confidence against the Halifax Government, the abdication of King Edward VIII, and the ascendancy of Clement Attlee and the Labour Party to the premiership. The declaration of war against Germany, the outbreak of the French Civil War, and the formation of the Franco-British Union made what had been implied in earlier months crystal clear: the powers of Western Europe had made their choice between the Axis and the Communist Internationale, and had opted for the latter.
This placed the Japanese leadership into something of a strategic bind.
The original plan for the “liberation” of Asia was to make war first against the ComIntern, securing their flanks by seizing Outer Manchuria and Hawai’i, and finally pacifying China. After that, and a few more years of preparation, they and their allies in the region would unleash the “Asiatic Spirit of War” and “liberate” everything from India to West Papua from the Europeans. If all went well, an Asia for Asians would be established by the year 1960. This plan was premised upon the assumption that the European Imperial Powers could be depended on to be either neutral or supportive. The initial, enabling crusade against communism was to be fueled by the free flow of resources from their colonies and capital from their metropoles. The Attlee government made that less than viable.
Over the course of successive Inter-Service and Imperial Conferences throughout the closing months of 1941, it was decided that rather than accept the situation, Japan would simply have to knock both the Communists and Colonialists out of the Indo-Pacific by the end of the decade. So, plans were drawn up, considered, revised, and implemented at a feverish pace. Agents in the Philippines and Dutch East Indies would expel their colonial governments with Japan’s assistance, and the Army would conquer Indochina and Malaya. With the Straits of Malacca and the Sunda Strait secured, the Army would begin operations against Burma, with the eventual objective of “liberating” British India. Meanwhile, the Navy would continually strike at the American Pacific Fleet, angling for a decisive battle that would shut the United Republics out of the Pacific entirely and halt the flow of supplies into China. The ultimate aim of this naval campaign was to take and hold Hawai’i, or at least deny its use to the WFRN. Additionally, an enormous string of defenses would be constructed from the Malaccas to Sunda to the Marianas to attrit and grind down any European or Communist attempts to strike at the Home Islands.
The fault in this of course was that it placed the Concordists into something of a strategic gyre. The war against the European colonialists was fundamentally motivated by a need to secure resources to fight the war against China and the United Republics. The war against the United Republics was to secure the Japanese flank and prevent the flow of support to the United Front while they sought decisive victories against the Chinese and Europeans. Finally, the war in China was motivated by a need for a labor pool to provide the finished goods needed to fight the Europeans and Americans. No one front could be neglected for fear of weakening the others, and so the Concordists were forced to split their forces evenly on three axes. This would spell their doom.
The Philippines
The campaign for the Philippines in part expressed itself as a civil war within the Philippine Commonwealth Defense Force. A plurality of the officer and NCO corps were Concordists or Concordist sympathizers, with the rest being split between those loyal to the British-backed Commonwealth government, and a loose grouping of communists and left-nationalists. This created a failure to respond effectively to the coup d’état in Manila. The ideological cliques failed to coordinate their response, and as such were forced to evacuate the capital or be destroyed in detail by KALIBAPI and the IJA. All told, the Philippine Campaign only lasted a month. While partisans would harangue the new Sovereign Philippine government in the countryside for the rest of the year, the important cities and lines of communication would be held by the new Sovereign Philippine Army (Soberanong Hukbo ng Pilipinas, SHP) with minimal help from the IJA.
The roots of this success can be seen in the course of development in the post-Red May Philippines, and how it differed in zones of British and Japanese influence.
British influence was concentrated in the north, particularly on Luzon around the capital. Here development occurred via investment by British, Australian, and Indian capital, largely importing high-level personnel to manage a largely indigenous labor force. However, the nature of development meant that some degree of capital investment did “leak out” into the general population. This created a sizable class of “middle men” within the local community - shopkeepers, logistics men, landlords, and above all officers and NCOs in the Commonwealth Defense Force. This class, while wealthier than most of the native population, were still fairly precarious, being a step or two below the largely European executives and high-level managers. This unique position - caught between the Scylla of a frankly atrociously racist set of superiors and the Charybdis of a growing workers movement that sought their abolition, they instead pivoted as a class towards right-wing Pan-Asianism. Those that did not make their way towards the Japanese-dominated South would be the nucleus of KALIBAPI’s northern contingent.
In the south, conversely, Japanese influence reigned, primarily in - but not limited to - the Special Economic Zone encompassing the island of Mindanao. Here, Japanese capital embarked on a program of crash industrialization with the help of Visayan and Japanese settlers. Positions were distributed on an equal basis, and Visayan workers and businessmen acted as the equals of their Japanese counterparts. But this was not all sunshine and rainbows - the titanic growth happening across the SEZ was fueled by death and suffering on an enormous scale. Under the guise of a “Pan-Asianist” civilizing mission, indigenous laborers were essentially worked to death in horrifically unsafe plantations, mines, and factories. This meant that the Visayan-Japanese settler class saw their quality of life rise dramatically, buoyed by this rising tide of blood. The extraordinarily rapid changes this crash industrialization brought about was essentially the same experience that Japan had gone through throughout the 1920s and 30s, and it bore similar fruit. The southern contingent of KALIBAPI were by far the most radical, fanatics who fully believed Concordism’s tenants and the notion that the Asiatic Spirit of speed, violence, and industry would bring about a new world by a glorious bloodletting in an war of Asian Liberation.
The Mindanao Special Economic Zone was effectively a tropical Manchukuo - not least due to the influence of the Japanese military. The 1934 agreement with the British had included extensive basing rights, which the IJA took full advantage of. From late 1941 onward the garrison was secretly built up and reinforced into a full Area Army. This force was placed under the jurisdiction of the new - and secret - General Army headquartered in Davao, the Liberation Army (Kaihōgun). Kaihōgun headquarters was the nerve center for the campaigns across Southeast Asia, and would be the primary coordination center for the campaigns to hold Southeast Asia against the Entente’s counteroffensive throughout 1943 and 1944.
Malaysia (by @WaltzinBrunhilda)
The Japanese attack against Commonwealth holdings on the Malay Peninsula would be regarded as one of the Commonwealth’s most vital defensive actions in the Pacific Theatre, despite apparent failures in the field. The joint Japanese-Thai assault was spearheaded by some of the best-trained jungle fighters on the planet, which - combined with Japanese air superiority and the effective use of bicycles on the march - allowed the Japanese to outmaneuver, overwhelm, and isolate many of the Commonwealth forces in the north of the Peninsula. However, the ability of Commonwealth forces to reform the defensive lines that would form the Malacca Pocket, and the Siege of Singapore is what makes the Malaysian Campaign so notable.
A key part of the Commonwealth flexibility can be put down to a series of highly effective delaying actions against the Japanese forces. Whilst the campaign is notable for its speed, and in many cases the Japanese managed to outflank or overrun Commonwealth positions, it did leave pockets of resistance across the peninsula, with isolated Commonwealth forces leading a series of last stands, delaying actions, and ambushes. Whilst these battles would never break into the mass cultural understanding of the new Australasia, they reflected the beginning of the emergence of a unified culture.
A key example of this is the Battle of Kluang from the 20th-22nd of February, 107 km north of Singapore. The only reason that the 12th Australian Infantry Battalion,- attached to the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Australian Infantry Division - was there in the first place was due to the near total breakdown of Commonwealth communications structures. Having been first ordered north to join the Malacca defense, before being recalled towards Singapore, the primarily Tasmanian force was spending the night encamped in the small town, when lead elements of the 42nd Regiment of the IJA 5th Infantry division started probing the town’s defenses. The Battalion, while drawn mainly from Tasmania, had a strong core of Chinese migrants who were determined to avenge themselves against the Japanese, and the advanced Japanese force was lured into a series of ambushes before being wiped out. However this drew the attention of the remainder of the Regiment. As more Japanese forces entered the combat zone, the 12th Battalion - lacking concrete orders - began to fortify the town, aiming to hold out for the rest of the day before beating a retreat after night fell. However, Japanese flanking attacks would cut the Singapore road, leaving the Battalion isolated and outnumbered. As the remainder of the 42nd began a serious assault against Australian positions, the commanders came to a decision. The 12th Battalion had been under the command of Sir John Gellibrand during the First World War, and Captain Charles Olding VC(posthumous)* refused to fail the legacy of the late General. The Battle of Kluang would last for two days, with Captain Olding killed in battle by a lucky Japanese shot. With his death the 12th Battalion would quickly surrender, but their sacrifice had not been in vain.
The two day delay of Japanese forces meant that rather than the Japanese vanguard marching across open causeways, the Japanese arrived with the causeways blown, and the HMAS Excalibur overlooking the Straits of Johor. As Japanese forces consolidated their position overlooking Singapore the initial attempts to establish Artillery positions were reduced to rubble with the HMAS Excalibur’s 9.2 inch guns shredding Japanese emplacements. However, as naval control over the South Seas grew increasingly dubious, Canberra ordered the retreat of Excalibur to Darwin. With the removal of the major Commonwealth threat to Japanese positions on the Strait of Johor, the Siege of Singapore began. A quartet of Type 45 guns were established overlooking Singapore. RAF Seletar was nearly totally destroyed within the first day of the bombardment, and much of the north shore of Singapore was heavily damaged. Nonetheless, with the Strait of Singapore holding, with the last redoubt in Sumatra providing another base for the Royal Navy the greatest worry of starvation was avoided. Instead the problem was water, and Japanese assaults across it.
To the north, Malacca would maintain in some ways a more fluid front, with the Japanese lines around Malacca proper famously sites of near constant infiltration attacks from both Communist and loyalist Partisans, as well as Commonwealth forces still holding the port. The Royal Melbourne Regiment, as the senior most Commonwealth force in the pocket would gain a majority of the fame for this record, despite later historical research revealing that New Zealander Maori forces were the main leaders of the raids against major artillery posts, alongside Communist partisans. Indeed Malacca is the one region of the Malay Campaign where it can be said that the Communists had any major influence, with pre-war efforts to build up Communist Party of Malaya proving highly successful in the area. Nonetheless the key effort that maintained the Malacca pocket was the efforts of the Royal Navy, despite the cultural images of rugged Australasians holding out against all odds. With the Indian Ocean primarily under British Control the Malacca supply run was one of the safest Commonwealth naval efforts during the dark days of 1942 and 43. Despite this, it was hardly free from Japanese attacks. This thin line was a major thorn in the Japanese side, because as long as Malacca held the Commonwealth was able to keep both the Sumatra redoubt and Singapore supplied, and even reinforced. While the Malaya campaign technically only lasted the month of February 1942, the Malayan front would remain a weeping sore for the remainder of the war.
The failure to secure the Straits of Malacca was the single greatest failure of the Japanese Campaigns in 1942. The transit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans were still open to Commonwealth ships, and until they were shut sealift resupply for Japanese forces in Burma (and eventually India) would be a very risky proposition. This placed a hard limit on the pace of operations in that theater. And while Imperial Navy patrols created something of a stopgap, the possibility of Commonwealth raiders steaming for the home islands remained a very real possibility. This - mostly because of the substantial diversion of IJN assets to campaigning in the Indian Ocean - meant that the General Staff was forced to delay the Hawai’i Campaign. At the January 1943 Imperial Conference, despite the strenuous objections of Yamamoto and his supporters, the invasion of Hawai’i (Operation Tea Bowl, or Chatsubo Sakusen, 茶壺作戦), intended to be the coup de grace in the war against the United Republics, would be delayed from July 1943 to January 1944.
Indonesia
By the eve of the Pacific War, the Dutch East Indies were really only that in name. After the disastrous 1936 uprising, the condominium agreement with the Japanese had swung further and further in Tokyo’s favor. While taxes flowed to and legitimacy from Amsterdam, it was clear where real power lay. The Imperial Japanese Army manned 65% of all garrisons, and Japanese capital had increasingly encroached on the Dutch for ownership, to the point where 47% of the economy was owned by the Japanese state or Japanese firms. A common saying during the Six-Year Condominium was that “we pay our taxes to Amsterdam, and send our harvests and goods to Tokyo.” Half the seats on the Volksraad were effectively controlled by the Japanese or their clients. Finally, the Japanese were much, much more popular with the local population than the Dutch. Not least because they actually involved natives in government and business.
The Japanese spent their time in the Dutch East Indies cultivating a sizable class of local administrators, businessmen, and other hangers-on, essentially running the same program they had on Mindanao. Indonesians found increasing employment in good-paying jobs as anything from laborers to foremen to managers in the new oil fields, steel mills, and factories that were growing like mold across Java and Sumatra. Seeing their standards of living skyrocket, many Javans and Sumatrans did not notice or care much about the reports of industrial barbarity coming out of the mines and plantations in the outlying islands, let alone Manchukuo or Mindanao. Nationalist activists that had not participated in the Revolt of 1936 were cultivated, particularly one Soepomo. The legal scholar found Concordism aligned quite well with his own personal combination of Hegelian proto-integralism and indigenous customary law. He would become the head of the clique of right-wing independence activists that were the Japanese voice in the Volksraad , and would eventually form the core of the National Renewal Party (Partai Pembaruan Nasional, PPN).
The upshot of this was that the Japanese had been digging out the foundations of the Dutch colonial administration for almost six years when they knocked the last brick out on March 19th, 1942.
It started the hour before dawn. The Kempeitai in Batavia, along with supporting IJA troops and local paramilitaries, entered the residency of Dutch Governor-General Alidius Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. The anonymous Kempeitai colonel handed Tjarda van Starkenborg Stachouwer a note, written in Dutch, demanding his and the Batavia Garrison’s surrender. Facing the bayonets of three dozen Japanese troops, he complied. Similar proceedings occurred in the provincial capitals over the coming hours. Most weren’t nearly as peaceful, with Dutch administrators, businessmen, and settlers often being beaten to death or hanged from their office windows. By noon, Jakarta and most of Java was firmly in Japanese hands. By the next morning all that remained of the Dutch were a few embattled pockets on Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Western New Guinea. While the sporadic fighting in those areas continued, Tjarda van Starkenborg Stachouwer himself would disappear into a jail cell in Cipinang, joining the countless Indonesians he had tossed into that hellhole. He was never heard from again. On the other hand, Dutch and Australian authorities managed to evacuate the hellhole camp of Boven Digoel due to poor infrastructure in Dutch New Guinea. Boven Digoel held the most unreformed communist and nationalist political prisoners of the 1936 uprisings, and the evacuation prevented them from falling into Japanese hands. This would have consequences down the line after the war, but the political prisoners, mostly of communist and left-wing nationalist persuasions, agreed to work with the Entente in the fight against Concordism.
For their part, the Japanese and the new PPN-dominated Republic of Insulindia made a big show of freeing the prisoners of the 1936 uprisings - or at least those that were particularly friendly or useful to the Japanese. In particular was Mohammed Husni Thamrin, who was placed atop the new Republic as National President. The presidency, however, proved to be a gilded cage - Thamrin found himself essentially under house arrest in the Grote Huis until his death in 1944. As for Soepomo, he was elevated as Prime Minister of the newborn republic. The real power, though, was in the Japanese Embassy and the IJA’s military liaison. They set quotas for Japanese and native-owned firms that were pouring resources into the Concordist war machine. “Advice” from the embassy rapidly became law. The Insulindian National Army was essentially an auxiliary force for the IJA’s Kaihogun , providing logistical and manpower assistance in the campaigns against Commonwealth holdings on Borneo and Papua. As a result of this “friendly inter-Asian cooperation,” Insulindia would partition British Malaya with Thailand and annex Australian New Guinea. The problem was that the straits of Malacca were far from secured by the end of 1942.
Despite their best efforts, the net the Japanese had cast over the Dutch East Indies was not perfectly airtight. British intelligence operatives and assets, gone deep underground after the start of hostilities a month before, immediately radioed GHQ India and ANZAC the relevant information. With GHQ Pacific bottled up in Singapore and Malacca, the Commonwealth forces under Commander-in-Chief, India General Claude Auchinleck were forced to respond quickly. Piling a corps of primarily British and Indian troops onto whatever transports and destroyers the Eastern Fleet could spare, Auchinleck threw what he could to occupy Northern Sumatra. Two days after the coup had started, the Commonwealth came to the aid of embattled Dutch Colonial troops on the Aceh coast. By immediately acting on this intelligence coup, the Commander-in-Chief, India was able to force the IJA and IJN to reorient from Malacca and Singapore, preventing the fall of both cities and denying the Japanese control over the strategically vital straits [1]. The occupation on Aceh also provided a link to the Andaman Islands and India, allowing for the reinforcement of Malacca and continued resupply of Singapore by submersible, lengthening both sieges and tying up not-inconsiderable Japanese, Thai, and Insulindian resources, while also facing a low-level insurgency from the Acehnese backed by the Japanese.
Indochina
The Indochina campaign was by far the most “conventional” of the Japanese blitz in 1942 - the campaign was mostly fought by French and Japanese regulars.
The Indochina campaign technically began on 6 March, 1942, with a mutiny in the colony’s garrison. While the civilian government and higher-level military officers in the colony were firm loyalists, this did not extend universally to the lower and middle ranks of the garrison. So, two days after Petain took Paris and declared the État Français , a little over 6,000 French regulars (about 1/8 of the French forces in the colony) in various garrisons across Indochina raided their armories and killed, captured, or coerced their Commanding officers. However, not all of the mutineers were successful. The uprisings in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane were put down over two days, and the remaining mutineers were scattered across the country - principally in Saigon. The loyalist forces dispersed across the colony to destroy the remaining Petainists. The colonial garrison had been badly mauled, reduced to a little under 75% of their paper strength between casualties, executions, and the stockade. Furthermore, they had been dispersed across the Colony, leaving them vulnerable to the Japanese invasion on 25 March.
The IJN’s Special Naval Landing Forces made quick work of the already badly mauled Saigon Garrison. Extraordinarily well-coordinated amphibious landings and parachute drops allowed the Japanese Marines to cut the southern province of the colony into easily managed pockets, and the garrison scarcely lasted more than two days. Simultaneously, an IJA division - reinforced by three regiments of the Reorganized NRA - crossed the border from Guangxi, marching for Hanoi. The Hanoi garrison quickly established roadblocks, and managed to halt the first-echelon Japanese columns at Thái Nguyên and Bắc Giang. Fierce fighting ensued, and while the Franco-Indochinese troops acquitted themselves well, they were forced to retreat into Hanoi proper on 3 April.
What followed was four weeks of intense street-to-street and house-to-house fighting, the most intense and brutal of the Pacific War thus far. French forces fought a fighting retreat, demolishing houses to make kill zones. Also engaging in the fighting were hastily formed worker militias, commanded by militants trained by the United Republic’s Combat Applications Cadre. The defenders of Hanoi forced the Japanese to pay a dear price for each house and block they took. In coming years, the Battle of Hanoi would be known to the Indochinese Federation as “our Stalingrad.” However, the Japanese had more than enough men and materiel to eventually overwhelm the defenders of Saigon. By April 25, the IJA, now reinforced by 3rd Yokosuka SNLF, had surrounded the Governor-General’s Palace. That morning, Governor-General Jules Brévié signed orders for the defenders that could to escape the Japanese cordon via the Red River and make for Burma, and dismissed his staff with instructions to follow them. After verifying that those that could had escaped, he transmitted similar orders to the garrisons that were left, then walked towards the Japanese lines with a white flag. Saigon had fallen.
Meanwhile, the Thai army had invaded Laos and Cambodia. The small portion of Laos west of the Mekong fell rapidly, and Thai columns reached the Mekong within a few days of hostilities. If the river crossings fell, Vientiane would be cut off from any possible routes of retreat into Burma. So, the French made the decision to surrender Vientiane and make for the Northern mountains. This is where they were, effectively fighting a guerilla war, when the orders to make for Burma arrived on 25 April. Cambodia was effectively cut off from the rest of French Indochina by the SNLF landings and the Thai invasion. While they fought bravely, they surrendered at Phnom Penh within two weeks. They would spend the rest of their war in Japanese POW camps. Most would not survive.
Indochina would not be easily swallowed by the growing Co-Prosperity Sphere however. While the Japanese nominally held near-total control over the French colonies, local resistance - already active against the French - rapidly coalesced, centering in Vietnam. On April 30, the Indochinese Communist Party, trained by the American CAC and led by Ho Chi Minh and Võ Nguyên Giáp, formed the League for the Independence of Vietnam, better known by the abbreviation of its vietnamese name (Việt Nam Độc lập Đồng minh): the Viet Minh. Similar organizations, also under the umbrella of the ICP, formed in Laos and Cambodia. They almost immediately began striking at the Japanese occupation from their base areas, bleeding the IJA for all they could. Indochina would become a tarpit for the Japanese, the resources they pulled out only barely breaking even compared to what they poured in.
As the Viet Minh began their campaign of resistance, French forces were retreating into British Burma - primarily through Long Yun’s Yunnan. Exhaustion, dehydration, and disease took its toll on the colonial garrison, and by the time they were received by their allies in Burma, the 20,000-odd soldiers that had fled Indochina had been reduced to 15,000.
Burma
The sudden influx of more than 15,000 French and Indochinese soldiers into British Burma over May 1942 sent the colony into chaos. The fall of Indochina had been sudden and brutal, and now Burma seemed to be next on the list. Indeed, the story that formed from the French troops - along with the massive failure in the Malaya Campaign - made it clear that the only slowly-reinforced forces of the Commander-In-Chief, India in Burma would not be able to defend itself against a Japanese-Thai invasion. Burma spent the next six months holding its breath, waiting for the other shoe to drop as the Japanese consolidated their new conquests. In New Dehli, India Command was paralyzed by indecision. Half of the Staff, including CinC, India Claude Auchinleck, wanted to try and hold Burma. The other half, and Viceroy Mountbatten, believed that any attempted defense of Burma would be futile, and energy, manpower, and resources would be better spent fortifying the Indo-Burman border. Eventually, after the intervention of the Imperial General Staff in London, a compromise solution was reached. A fortification system would be constructed along the Arakan Mountains, eventually christened the Mountbatten Line. Meanwhile Commonwealth forces in Burma - primarily British, Indian, and Australasian - would remain in-country to try to maul the Japanese and make the advance to India as costly as possible.
The Japanese invasion on November 1st made it clear that was not viable. More than 300,000 men, organized into the Burma Area Army (緬甸方面軍, Biruma hōmen gun) and reinforced by more than 5,000 Thai troops, invaded Burma from Thailand. There were only about 75,000 Commonwealth troops in the colony. Mawlamyine fell on the first day, and the IJA was at the gates of Rangoon in less than three days. To prevent a full rout, Auckinleck ordered all Commonwealth forces to retreat to the Mountbatten line. While the Japanese hardly made it easily, by November 20th most of the Commonwealth forces were on the other side of the Mountbatten Line, their ranks swelling with Indian Volunteers, spurred on by the formation of the Indian Commonwealth.
This began what would be known in India as the “Phony War,” as India found itself on war footing, but not seeing much if any fighting. Commonwealth and Japanese forces would be seen in historical memory as not doing much but stare at each other across the Mountbatten line for the next ten months. This is not entirely accurate, as the relative quiet on the Mountbatten line would be punctuated by periodic raids and artillery and sniper duels. But the armies stood still, resources and food pouring in, stretching the carrying capacity of Bengal to its limits…
Conclusions
The campaigns of 1942 had consolidated the broad but insecure Japanese resource base in Southeast Asia into an extremely well-connected network of client states. They had done this entirely due to the cooperation of local irregulars and collaborators, allowing for considerable military gains with comparatively little expenditure on the part of the Army or Navy. They had conquered one of the greatest empires in world history almost without firing a single shot. It should also be said that this would not have been possible without the help of the British government specifically and European governments generally.
The fear of Communist-led anti-colonial revolts had led to them aligning themselves with the most powerful actor in the region, and handing them the keys to the kingdom. While they were very much anti-communist - even more so than the colonizers - the Japanese did not have their best interests at heart. They had been handed an empire by the Europeans, and would do all that they could to secure it. This is exactly what they did over the course of 1942. The resulting gains would spend the coming months and years feeding oil, rubber, steel, and countless other resources into the industrial centers of Daehan and Manchukuo, fuelling the war economy that would trample over China and India, and eventually reach as far as the Hawaiian islands. But the Concordist High Tide would ebb.
The strategic gyre that Yasuhito had sailed his nation into placed hard limits on the expansion of the Concordist war machine, and those limits would become glaringly apparent over the next two years.
[1] This is a minor retcon/addition that primarily exists to justify Singapore not falling throughout the war. *[WPA]: Works Progress Administration *[NBI]: National Bureau of Investigation
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