Excerpts from The Intendance Service of the WFRA: A History, 7th Edition (Kansas City: Military Publishing Directorate, 2010)
…Still further logistical challenges faced the Joint Stavka’s prosecution of the revolutionary war effort. Even as the lion’s share of the effort remained focused, as it should, at solving the primary obstacles blocking the transport of men and materiel to the Soviet Union, and the secondary challenges of sustaining the circulatory system of the Soviet war economy following the loss of key agricultural, mineral, industrial, and human resources to Axis occupation, additional logistical challenges still awaited.
It would not be sufficient to merely stop the forward advance of Axis troops. Even leaving aside the political dimensions of a long-term occupation of the western territories of the USSR, penetrations into the core territory of the country placed critical economic resources within range of aerial attack. Resources spent rebuilding damaged factories and communications infrastructure, as well as those spent on anti-aircraft artillery, could not be used to put soldiers under arms to carry the fight to the enemy.
Seizing the strategic initiative in the theater meant recapturing territory that had been blighted by more than a year of Nazi occupation. The break of gauge between the European and Eurasian railway networks, a boon during the calamities of 1940 and 1941, would now cut the other way. The Wehrmacht had painstakingly rebuilt the railways to 1435 mm gauge[1], remanufactured what rolling stock that had not been captured, tore up the Soviet railway signals for the Deutsche Reichsbahn’s own, and tore up every centimeter of track they did not intend to use to meltdown for raw materials.
Mirroring Red Army practice in evacuations eastward, the Supreme Command of the Total War had issued a pattern of instructions that had amounted to a general order for a scorched earth policy during tactical or operational level withdrawals. This would later be reinforced following the promulgation of Fuhrer Directive No. 51, the so-called “Clausewitz Decree” directing a general policy of scorched earth in the East following the retreat from Stalingrad.
[…]
Exploitation operations following the Battle of Moscow had encountered numerous difficulties. The one that consumed the Military Railway Service and its chief, Lt. Gen. Maxwell Sinclair, was the difficulty of establishing new railheads. The counteroffensive had reached its culminating point due to the logistical constraints before the destruction of men and materiel. At the end of the tether, offensive forces suffered high casualties holding the reclaimed ground while the Rear Service troops rehabilitated the railways and established new railheads within the range of the field armies they serviced.
In January of 1942, the Railway Troops issued Operational Requirement 4851.2, developed in conjunction with the staff of the Military Academy of Logistics and Transport in Louisville, and a consulting group from the Ohio Valley Directorate of the American Rail Link. OR 4851.2 created specifications for the WFRA’s first purpose-built military diesel-electric locomotive. The related OR 4851.1 specification solicited proposals for a family of gauge convertible railcars, intended to regauged in the field with only mobile workshops. Both were intended to be operated either directly by the Army’s own Military Railway Service or by mobilised sections of the ARL.
The OR 4851.1 standard is perhaps less interesting for our examination, because it had few technical risks. The field adjustable trucks had already been refined by Link R&D groups, and would be standardized among all types. Consequently, all the companies under the aegis of the North American Railcar and Locomotive Collective produced freight cars to this specification. Perhaps the most notable outcome was that the first articulated JANIS wellcar[2] series was produced by the Budd Stalina factory of Philadelphia under this contract.
The requirements promulgated in OR 4851.2 were quite strenuous. Most existing diesel-electric locomotives had been built for passenger service, the existing Link freight-rated inventory of diesel locomotives were considered deficient for the requirements of the Intendance. Most featured diesel prime movers rated in the 700 to 800 kW range, and consequently struggled when faced with higher grades.
The MRS had already adopted a variant of an existing ALCO locomotive for large scale service both for itself as well as lend-lease to the Soviet state railways. The resulting RSD-1 had been performing acceptably, though the modifications from a four-axle to a six-axle arrangement to suit more restrictive axle load limits had resulted in a somewhat anemic locomotive. Additionally, prime mover operational life had proven somewhat lacklustre. Nonetheless, the design had shown sufficient promise to convince Lt. Gen. Sinclair that the concept was sound, and the design’s distinctive hood unit[3] configuration would be included in OR 4851.2.
Initial consultation with [North American Railcar & Locomotive Collective] representatives, further refined the proposal. The NARLC designed a variable gauge three-axle truck powered by three GE DC traction motors, field configurable to operate on railways ranging from 1000 mm to 1676 mm. Three NARLC affiliate corporations responded to the tender: ALCO, Fairbanks-Morse, and EMD. With the acceptance of all three due to production constraints at each individual collective, the specification was revised to increase parts commonality among the designs, particularly in the areas of operator controls. The revised specification also included the provision of head-end power so that units could also serve as mobile generators if needed.
The specification required a road switcher[4] locomotive with compact bodywork able to fit restrictive loading and structural gauges[5] across the world. Fixtures such as couplers would also have to be field-replaceable. Ancillary to the locomotive itself, the specification also tendered orders for truck-mobile shops to support its operations, especially the deployment of gauge-change shops.
All three models were accepted for service in Fall 1942, adapting existing production lines to reduce lead time. ALCO’s was accepted as Military Road Switcher Type 1, powered by an ALCO 241 series turbocharged four-stroke V-12 prime mover driving a General Electric DC generator rated at 1,200 kW. The MRS-1’s hood unit was highly reminiscent of the earlier RS-1 series, though it was shorter, with a flat roof to the cab that was level with the hood.
EMD’s MRS-2 was outwardly very similar, but could be distinguished most easily by the peaked roof of the long-hood, and the distinctive sound of the Roots-type supercharged two-stroke EMD 93 series V-16 prime mover, also rated for 1,200 kW. Though shipped with an in-house designed and built DC generator, it would not be uncommon in later years to find examples that had been rebuilt with surplus GE generators thanks to clearances specified in the OR.
Of the three, the Fairbanks-Morse MRS-3 locomotives were the most troublesome of the type. The design suffered difficulty adapting the collective’s 970/206 series six-cylinder opposed piston diesel prime movers to locomotive use, necessitating a redesign of the cooling system. This delay in service acceptance largely saw the model put to use on the domestic rail network.
All three would be produced in both cab-equipped A-units as well as cabless B-units to support longer trains with multiple-working locomotives. All units after the initial prototype batch were produced with controls labeled in both English and Russian.
[…]
After breaking-in runs carrying cargo along the Trans-Iranian or Trans-Siberian roads, the delivered MRS series locomotives were transferred to full operational status with the rear area services at the front. Despite some issues with the adjustable axles, military locomotive engineers found the new locomotives to be a marked improvement over previous engines, owing chiefly to the increasing maturity of diesel-electric technology. Since they were less reliant on extensive track-side support infrastructure for coaling and water tending than steam engines, they were less susceptible to the ongoing logistical attrition warfare. They were also much more resilient against direct air attack by aircraft cannon, and more easily repairable. Steam locomotive maintenance cycles also necessitated more downtime and the use of time-consuming, scarce skilled labor to rebuild boiler and engine fixtures. The interchangeable nature of parts due to the modern internal combustion industry’s tighter manufacturing tolerances enabled higher up-time and regular preventative maintenance.
The variable gauge locomotives would have their first proof of concept in the counter-offensives after the Second Battle of Stalingrad. Following the degradation and destruction of German mechanised units attempting to reduce the Stalingrad salient, INTREV forces engaged in broad-scale offensive action across over a thousand kilometres of theatre frontage in the Caucasus region and Volga basin.
Despite the best efforts of German saboteurs, INTREV forces liberated thousands of railcars intact, as well as hundreds of kilometres of rail network. Once sabotage and battle damage was rehabilitated by engineering forces, the MRS rapidly deployed transfer workshops to cross the break of gauge. As soon as sabotage was cleared from a line, trains were run from the main logistical center at Stalingrad to field army railheads located fifty to one hundred kilometres from the line of contact.
The significance of this cannot be understated. Load limits of railcars vary greatly, especially taking into account axle load limits imposed by the war-ravaged infrastructure, but loads in the range of thirty tonnes were most common on boxcars, and fifty to seventy tonnes on flatcars. With forty to fifty cars entrained, a small train crew could move more materiel than hundreds of trucks and their crews. Including, crucially, the very trucks that would support the offensive into enemy held territory.
[…]
Operations in the immediate rear area of the advancing Stalingrad and Voronezh Fronts were particularly hazardous. While the diesel exhaust was less visible than the coal burning steam locomotives, it was all but impossible to camouflage a moving train in daylight hours. Operational realities dictated that freight moves could not only occur at night, and arranging makeshift yards to house rolling stock near the front proved infeasible. In particular, movements of unloaded trains back from railheads to rear yards occurred during the day.
Air superiority was relative. Once the dawn broke, Luftwaffe fighters and attack aircraft would be operating in the air space above. Even with the installation of anti-aircraft artillery, trains made tempting targets. Many surviving specimens of the MRS-1 and MRS-2 bear some signs of combat damage. Field modification was common, with many trains having additional structural steel welded around the crew cabins or around the prime mover and generator. Some even had armor-grade steel, usually salvaged from destroyed personnel carriers and light tanks.
Most of these field modifications occurred without higher level authorization and must be viewed in this light. In tests on modified locomotives slated for scrapping, the [Materiel Testing Directorate] found that the protection afforded by field appliqué armor of dubious value at best, with some being found to increase the risk of crew casualty due to spalling. Nonetheless, for morale reasons a blind eye was turned except in cases where crews pilfered resources to the determinant of the overall military.
The Intendance did spend some resources developing a standard field appliqué kit with an eye to official approval, but ultimately none of the prototypes ever gained official approval. The situation on the front developed more rapidly in INTREV’s favor, reducing the frequency of aerial attacks even in the immediate rear of the line-of-contact. And owing to the poor state of infrastructure, orders were sent down to the field service brigades to remove most field modifications to resolve axle weight issues.
[…]
Military road-switchers proved incredibly useful in the other theaters of war. Owing to the expeditionary nature of INTREV involvement, the capture and utilization of existing rolling stock was of paramount importance. Resources could not be spared to continually regauge track behind advances.
The liberation campaigns into Italian East Africa required the rapid utilization of existing rail, such as it was. A disparate network of sub-metre, metre-gauge and “Cape gauge”[6] rails had been consolidated by the Italian Colonial Railways into a single Cape-gauge network following the conquest. While grand plans for completing Cecil Rhodes’ vision of a “Cape to Cairo” network existed on paper, even during the period of Italian ascendency over North and East Africa little work would be done on it.
Ironically, it would take INTREV intervention to realize the Rhodesian dream. Following the landings at Mogadishu, troops of the WFRA’s East African Expeditionary Force rapidly exploited into the strategic depth, trapping the bulk of the Italian colonial troops in the Mombassa cauldron.
In the interim, communist forces operated in uneasy, informal cooperation with the Franco-British colonialists. The Attlee-Blum diumvirate extended diplomatic recognition to the INTREV-backed Somali provisional government, but gave no promises of territorial concession. With the Dakar Conference in January 1944, some sketches of post-war Africa began to take shape. Decolonisation by way of Dominionisation, a compromise that pleased almost no one, became the official program of the United Nations.
American MRS-series locomotives shuffled troops and materiel across East Africa, supporting the liberation of Ethiopia and the Sudan, while American railwaymen worked hand-in-hand with British imperialists to build out the Cape-to-Cairo network. While acknowledged as a political betrayal of pre-war commitments to decolonial revolution, this aid to the imperialists did prove to be something of a poisoned chalice for London.
The seeds of post-war revolutionary struggle were surreptitiously planted in this cooperation. From their strongholds in revolutionary Somalia, Eritrea, Morocco, and Liberia, networks of espionage and labor agitation spread at the speed of the locomotive. To build trust among the locals, the Military Railway Service selected men from Haiti or the American Black Belt, training them in local languages to serve as contacts. Locals were hired as labor auxiliaries as permitted under the Dakara Conference’s terms, and surreptitiously trained and organised as RIVA clandestine regiments.
[1] Track gauge refers to the width between the rails on a rail line.
[2] Joint Army/Navy Intermodal System, a family of intermodal shipping containers developed to reduce the need for break-bulk shipping, eventually the standard for all intermodal shipping traffic in the Comintern.
[3] Hood units are built as a bridge-style frame, with a hood covering the internal workings in the front and back that is not a structural member. The hood is not the full width of the body, allowing visibility both front and rear, as well as creating a walk-way for maintenance around the body.
[4] As rail technology developed and railroads began to handle more cargo, longer trains, longer distances, and branching networks, they needed large rail yards to sort and assemble railcars into trains. ‘Switcher’ (‘shunter’ in British English) locomotives were the specialized locomotives designed to do this job and other low speed handling. In contrast to the ‘road’ locomotives most people think of when they picture a steam locomotive, switchers were smaller, lower power, with cabs designed for good two way visibility. Some of the first diesel and electric locomotives were switchers. ‘Road switchers’ were an innovation made possible by advances in diesel-electric propulsion, allowing a single locomotive to do both jobs well. Most locomotives in OTL North America are road switchers.
[5] Two closely related concepts: loading gauge maximum dimensions of the rolling stock permitted on a line. Structural gauge refers to how closely bridges and other structures may intrude onto a rail right of way.
[6] 3 ft 6 in/1067 mm gauge railways, so-named because they were standardized by the Cape Government Railways in Cape Colony. *[WPA]: Works Progress Administration *[NBI]: National Bureau of Investigation
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