The July Crisis: Two Perspectives

Excerpts from the book, The End of the Belle Époque , Reginald Bassett

Published by Cambridge University Press © 1952, Cambridge, The United Kingdom

…The most striking fact about the diplomatic period preceding the July Crisis was the improvement of the position of the Central Powers within the Balkans. The Second Balkan War, if contained as a purely local affair, may have perhaps seen the balance of power preserved in the region, but the increasing Austrian alignment with Bulgaria and the subsequent arming of Greco-Serbian forces by the Entente had the effect of turning it into a proxy confict and hardening diplomatic allegiances that were not necessarily set in stone. Without the involvement of the great powers in the conflict, it is possible that Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans would not have been perceived by Russia as a terminal threat to its interests in the region.

As it was, on the eve of the July Crisis the client states of the Central Powers held a swathe of territory running from the Black Sea to Durres. Bulgarian forces were approaching Belgrade, and Salonica was Bulgarian. In large part, the Austrian-Ottoman-Bulgarian axis in the Balkans had rendered moot any real concern about Entente “encirclement”. This situation has led many historians to be skeptical that the war could have been caused principally by the Central Powers: the logic is that a winner would not feel the need to provoke a conflict. Unsurprisingly, the blame is often placed on larger-scale, “structural” factors, or on Russia or the ambivalence of the Russo-British alliance.

Yet it is now clear that the blame for the war lies principally with the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, who conspired with the German military staff to throw Europe into war. On the 29th of June, Bethmann Hollweg instructed the diplomatic staff to restrain Austria from issuing an ultimatum to Serbia. This was not a pacific gesture, but an attempt to buy time as he consulted with military leaders to determine whether a European war would be in Germany’s interest. The Austrians, who had diverted much of their soldiers to help collect the harvest, were not planning on issuing their ultimatum until at least the middle of July, as they were not prepared for war. Still, this seemed to be more of a purely precautionary measure: the internal correspondence of Austrian diplomats indicates that they intended to keep the ultimatum light and relatively easy for Serbia to accept. With Bulgarian forces soon to be laying siege to Belgrade, the more diplomatically-minded Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza convinced the rest of the ministerial council on July 2nd that there was no need to write an ultimatum that unduly provoked the Russians. The announcement later that week of Sophia of Hohenburg’s recovery calmed tensions further.

At this point, if Austria had restrained its Bulgarian client, they may have avoided the bellicose Russian response that was to follow. With both the French and particularly the British aiming to restrain Russia, a deal may have been brokered that saw a territorially intact Serbia remain while ensuring de facto Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans. This would have been yet another victory for the central powers. Nonetheless, though they had decided not to intervene in the conflict themselves for now, they did give the Bulgarians a “blank check” to proceed with the assault on Belgrade. In truth, this check came more from the Germans than the Austrians, who believed in the aftermath of the Romanian incident that the British may not intervene if the crisis caused a European war.

On July 7th, Russia mobiized against the Ottoman Empire and also put their military districts in Kazan and Turkestan on pre-mobilization footing. This was a gesture explicitly intended not to provoke the Central Powers, as the Russians still felt as if they did not have the support of the British for a general european war. The refusal to put the West Russian military districts in Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine on even a pre-mobilization, “preparatory to war” footing indicated this. The Germans understood this too: several military observers would report back on the 9th that they did not believe that the Russians aimed to start a general European war.

On July 10th, Bethmann Hollweg, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Falkenhayn met in Berlin. With the British government teetering on the brink and the Russians potentially isolated, Hollweg believed he was on the cusp of peacefully breaking the entente asunder. A confidential cable to the foreign ministry later that day announced the intention of using the crisis ”…To isolate Russia from Britain as Bismarck played the South German states against the French, then to force on it the recognition of a new reality in the Balkans and West Asia”. Falkenhayn, meanwhile, was pushing for an immediate mobilization against both Russia and France. This was in line with traditional German military thinking, which called for a quick mobilization against France to allow Germany to knock it out of a two front war before Russia could bring to bear its large army on East Prussia. But several junior officers in attendance who had been in contact with reconnaissance units in Russia explained that the partial mobilization in the Southern districts would have the effect of making an eventual Russian mobilization in the North more difficult.

This allowed Bethmann Hollweg to persuade the Kaiser to avoid an immediate, pre-emptive mobilization and gave him time for his “diplomatic” solution, which in fact amounted to an abandonment of his Ottoman allies. By pointedly refusing to back the Ottomans after the “Albanian Crisis”, Bethmann Hollweg both curried favor with the British government and successfully convinced the Russians that a war against the Ottomans would not become a larger, European one. Hollweg hoped that a Russian declaration of war against the Ottomans and Bulgaria would prompt a more formal British withdrawal from the Entente, as traditional British fears of Russian control of the Straits of Dardanelles would once again take prominence in British foreign policy.

Crucially, Bethmann Hollweg did not consult with either the Austrians or Bulgarians before making this decision. While the Germans may have been willing to sacrifice the Turks for a long-term realignment of British loyalties, the Austrians perceived any incursion of the Russians into Anatolia as a potentially existential threat to their position in the Balkans. At this point, the Bulgarians felt similarly. Upon being notified of the German decision, the Austrians in effect threatened the Germans with a European War, stating that the refusal of Germany to back the Turks against the Russians would lead to a “much harsher” ultimatum to Serbia. Germany might be willing to sanction a localized Turko-Russian war, but it would not be able to stand back as the Russians invaded Galicia and Hungary.

On the 16th, Bethmann Hollweg, Wilhelm II, and Falkenhayn met again. This time, Wilhelm II upbraided Bethmann Hollweg for abandoning both the Ottomans and Austrians. Once again, Falkenhayn pressed for a mobilization, but Wilhelm II refused once more, believing that the Russians could be dissuaded from attacking Turkey with some firm diplomacy. Bethmann Hollweg was instructed to do whatever was necessary to re-assure the Austrians of the German commitment to their security.

Later that day, Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn met privately. Both were concerned that despite his bellicose rhetoric, Wilhelm II would be unwilling to go to war if it turned out to be necessary. Though we do not have minutes of this private meeting, a note in Hollweg’s journal states “Falkenhayn makes point that war, if necessary, would be best after France-Russia summit…ensures less coordination”. The “France-Russia summit” was a visit of Poincare, the French President, and Viviani, the Prime Minister, to St. Petersburg from July 19-24. It was reasoned that a war against the Entente would go more smoothly if its leaders could not communicate as easily in its opening days.

On the 17th, the Germans put out another statement on the Ottoman-Russian crisis, this time intentionally adoping a stance of strategic ambiguity. At the same time, the Austrians were re-assured that the Germans would participate in any war that saw the Russians approach Istanbul. Reluctantly, the Austrians agreed to deliver the initial, ligher version of the ultimatum to Serbia. It called for the suppression of publications which incite hatred of Austria-Hungary, the dissolution of the Serbian nationalist organization “Narodna Odbrana”, the elimination of anti-Austrian propaganda within school textbooks, the arrest of known collaborators with the assassins, and the cessation of arms traffic into Austria-Hungary.

On the 20th, Serbia issued a blanket refusal to abide by the terms of the ultimatum. There is no doubt that this refusal needlessly inflamed matters. The thinking in the Serbian government seemed to be that the only way to avoid being reduced to a Bulgarian rump state was Russian intervention in the Albanian Crisis. But even after being assured of French support, the Russians refused to provide Serbia with its full backing, insisting that they accept the ultimatum. In response, the Serbs committed an act of political suicide, refusing the ultimatum in the hope that an Austrian declaration of war would force the Russians’ to intervene on their behalf against both Bulgaria and Austria.

The Serbian refusal to negotiate led to outrage within both Austria and Germany. Some have argued that this refusal is what led Bethmann Hollweg to conclude that war with Russia was inevitable, but the Falkenhayn-Hollweg meeting and the correspondence in its immediate wake indicates that war with Russia was being seriously contemplated before the Serbian refusal. Nonetheless, it certainly had the effect of hardening the German position. On the 22nd, the german foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow visited Austria and telegrammed to Berlin that Austria would not be ready for war before the 28th, indicating that war planning was already well underway.

The British offered to mediate on the 22nd. This was an attempt to avert the fall of the Liberal government, which had grown divided about their commitment to Russia in a European War. For three days, the Germans responded receptively to these entreaties. Bethmann Hollweg wrote to Falkenhayn that “we must at least respond to the British requests - if and when matters do come to a head, it will be helpful not to be perceived too much as the strong-headed ones”. A meeting of Von Below and Grey was set to take place on the 26th.

On the 23rd, Belgrade was surrounded, and the French offered “unconditional support” to Russia following the final day of diplomatic talks in St. Petersburg. This promise of support along with the impending fall of Belgrade jointly prompted the Russians to put the Kiev military district on pre-mobilization footing in an attempt to deter Austrian intervention in the coming invasion of Anatolia. Once again, German military spies correctly assessed that the pre-mobilization footing was not an offensive measure but an attempt at deterrence.

On the 25th, a German spy reported that the past couple days had seen increased rail-way activity throughout both the Polish and Vilno military districts. This prompted an emergency meeting the next day between Bethmann Hollweg, Falkenhayn, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Tirpitz, who were fortuitously all in the Berlin area. This time, Bethmann Hollweg and and Falkenhayn both pressed for an immediate general mobilization against Russia. What had changed? It has now been conclusively established that Russia was not mobilizing the Polish or Wilno military districts. The troop movements there were simply a matter of the complex Russian mobilization system, which required troops to be shuffled around many different districts. Several military officials had informed Falkenhayn of this before the meeting.

The best explanation for the much more bellicose stance of the German Government is that, firstly, the Austrian Army would finally be prepared for war in three days, and secondly, the coming fall of Belgrade would allow for an immediate Austrian mobilization in Galicia and even parts of East Prussia, allowing for more German troops to be dedicated to the assault on France. The fact that a vote of no confidence looked like it was about to occur in the British Parliament also helped matters. In short: the Russian troop activity in Polish was more a pretext for a war Germany had already been planning to launch than a genuine casus belli.

As Germany mobilized on the 26th, Russia felt prompted to do the same. On the 27th, believing that a European war was inevitable, they began the invasion of Ottoman Armenia. On the 28th, the British Government narrowly survived the vote of no confidence with a promise to avert war in Europe after securing the support of Labor representatives. It was widely understood to be one of the shortest mandates ever given to a British government by Parliament. The same day, Germany delivered an ultimatum to France which demanded France convince Russia to cease its mobilization against Germany or face a declaration of war. The following day, H.H. Asquith announced that the British Government would defend France in the event of a German attack, prompting another no-confidence vote to be scheduled on August 2nd. An unlikely coalition of conservatives and radicals looked poised to oust Asquith, with the radicals hoping to regain control over their own party and the conservatives looking to take the reins of government in coalition with some moderate liberals in a “government of national unity”.

With the invasion of Armenia achieving several rapid successes, Russia began a general mobilization, prompting Austria-Hungary to do the same. On August 1st, the Great War began as Germany declared war on France after its refusal to submit to several ultimatums that would have meant the end of the Entente as an alliance. On the 1st, as his final act as Prime Minister H.H. Asquith declared war on Germany, infuriating many of the radicals in his coalition. He resigned the next day before the no-confidence vote. On the 2nd, Bonar Law was tasked with forming a new government; he quickly found willing partners among the more reasonable Liberals.

Excerpts from the book, The Great Deluge: Europe 1914-1924 , Arthur Schlesinger Sr

Published by Harvard University Press © 1953, Boston, The United States

…The historical mythology which places sole guilt for the war on Germany typically proceeds through an examination of the diplomatic manuevering in the July Crisis. It should be insisted that such an analysis will never be sufficient to assign sole “guilt” to Germany for the war, since the war itself was the product of processes that stretched at least decades into the past, and which all of the European powers were willing participants in. Even so, an impartial and just adjudication of the actions of the principal actors in the July Crisis does not reveal any unambiguous verdict on the guilty and the innocent.

The blame for the war is traditionally laid on Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn. As a military man, Falkenhayn was indeed accustomed to military solutions, though he did not have the power to act unilaterally. He required the consent of the Kaiser, and in crucial moments, the Kaiser showed himself to be unwilling to committ to a war unless both Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn presented a unanimous front. For all his bluster, the Kaiser believed a European War to be a last resort, and he was more interested in using the threat of conflict to bolster Germany’s position than he was in conflict itself.

This is true of Bethmann Hollweg as well. His fear, and the fear of Germany’s entire military establishment, was that the Russian military expansion program would make the German-Austrian coalition unable to fight a two-front war within the next three years, and thus render the nation at a permanent strategic disadvantage. He may have been willing to accept such a scenario if there were assurances of Russia’s pacific intentions, or if the Entente alliance itself had not grown significantly in the past three or four years. As it was, however, this was an unacceptable situation.

Nonetheless, at no point prior to the Russian troop movements in Poland on July 25th was Hollweg set upon war. The gamble he made was to isolate Russia in the crisis, not to use it to provoke a war between the great powers. The meeting on the 16th between Falkenhayn and Hollweg did not end in Hollweg promising support for Falkenhayn; much more plausible is the notion that it was simply meant to clear the air between the two men, who were at loggerheads in the previous meetings. The clearest record we do have of Hollweg’s intentions is a private entry he wrote on the 12th, which reads “We may need to go to war with Russia…but only if Russia itself wants a war. The crisis will allow us to determine this”.

In short, Hollweg aimed to use the crisis to both discern Russian intentions and attempt to foment splits within the Entente. War was a final and last resort if Russian intransigence indicated that they would remain a hostile power after their military expansion was completed. The Russian troop movements on the 25th were treated with quite genuine alarm in the emergency meeting of German military and civilian leaders; this would not be expected if it was viewed merely as a pretext for war. At most, the Germans can be accused of acting over-hastily in this situation by beginning a general mobilization before consulting with the Russians.

None of this is to claim that the fault for the war instead lies with the Russians or the French. The Russians were in a terribly uncomfortable position, on the verge of seeing their presence in the Balkans all but disappear. British waffling understandably led the French to a more uncompromising commitment to the Russians. German refusals to truly engage in British mediation were an indication of the paranoia of its leaders.

The point that must be driven home is that blame for the war cannot be laid at the feet of any of the European Powers alone, because doing so constitutes a failure to consider why the July Crisis was a historical possibility in the first place. Whoever can be proportioned the most blame during July 1914, the much weightier and more vital question still remains: why was European civilization so willing to engage in the suicidal violence of the next half-decade to settle questions of comparative influence in the Balkan backwoods?